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 Identifying what instances of belief are knowledge has long been 
a problem of philosophy. From Plato until the 1960s, the traditional posi-
tion was that knowledge was simply justified, true belief. Since Edmund 
Gettier showed in 1963 that justified, true belief is not sufficient for knowl-
edge, various modifications to the traditional position have been suggest-
ed.1  Chief among these suggestions was Alvin Goldman’s suggestion in 
1967 that a justified, true belief is knowledge only if that belief is causally 
connected with the fact that makes it true.2 
 In this paper, I will show that Goldman’s causal condition is not, 
in combination with a justified, true belief, sufficient for knowledge. I will 
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I. Introduction
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the causal theory of knowledge put 
forth by Alvin Goldman in his 1967 paper “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” 
Goldman contends that a justified, true belief is knowledge if and only if 
it is causally connected to the fact that makes it true. This paper provides 
examples, however, of justified, true beliefs with such causal connec-
tions that are clearly not knowledge. The paper further shows that at-
tempts to salvage the causal theory are unsatisfactory.
1. Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23.6 (1963): 
121.




do so first by giving an example in which a justified, true belief is causally 
connected only incidentally with the fact that makes it true. My second 
counter-example to Goldman will show that self-fulfilling prophecies pres-
ent a problem for Goldman and the causal theory of knowledge. I close the 
paper with a suggested revision to the causal theory.
 Edmund Gettier, in his 1963 paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowl-
edge?,” famously demonstrated that a true, justified belief is not necessar-
ily knowledge.3  Gettier gave two cases of justified, true beliefs (JTBs) that 
are not knowledge.4  We may imagine that Smith has applied for a job. 
Smith is told by the president of the company that Jones will actually get 
the job. Smith also just saw Jones count the coins in his pocket, seeing him 
count to 10. Smith then forms the following justified belief: ‘The man who 
will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket.’ Smith, not Jones, actually gets 
the job. Coincidentally and unbeknownst to Smith, Smith also has 10 coins 
in his pocket, and so his belief ‘The man who will get the job has 10 coins 
in his pocket’ is justified and true. It clearly is not the case, however, that 
Smith knew ‘The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket’ when 
he formed the belief.
 Alvin Goldman, in his 1967 paper “A Causal Theory of Knowing,” 
attempted to resolve the problem presented by the Gettier cases by amend-
ing the traditional definition of knowledge to include the requirement that 
a subject’s justified true belief (JTB) of some fact (p) must be causally con-
nected with that fact (p).5  Goldman offers the following interesting case 
where his causal theory triumphs over the traditional JTB analysis. Sup-
pose there is some person, T, who intends to go downtown on Monday. T 
communicates the intention to S on Sunday, who forms the justified belief 
(p): ‘T will go downtown on Monday.’ T then decides not to go downtown, 
but is kidnapped and taken downtown, and so (p) is true. Under the tra-
3. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?“ 121.
4. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” 122.
5. Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing,” 358.
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ditional, JTB account of knowledge, S’s belief of (p) is knowledge. Accord-
ing to Goldman’s position, however, since there is no causal connection 
between S’s belief of (p) and the fact that (p) is true, S’s belief of (p) is not 
knowledge. Since, intuitively, S’s belief of (p) is not knowledge, Goldman’s 
theory triumphs over the traditional theory.
 I now hope to show that Goldman’s JTB+C (that is: justified, true 
belief with causal connection) is not sufficient for knowledge. I claim that 
there are cases of justified true beliefs with causal connections to the facts 
making them true which are not proper instances of knowledge.
 In this section, I will present an example of a case in which a justi-
fied, true, belief is causally connected to the fact that makes it true but is 
not knowledge.
 Case 1: Jack decides, on Saturday, that he would like to have 
lunch downtown on Sunday, and sends an e-mail to Renee on Satur-
day telling her he will be downtown Sunday without giving her an 
explanation. Renee, knowing Jack to be honest and reliable, forms 
the justified belief that Jack will be downtown on Sunday. Unfor-
tunately, the e-mail is intercepted by terrorists planning to kidnap 
the President, who is (unbeknownst to Jack) going to be downtown 
on Sunday. Since Jack is a highly trained government operative, the 
terrorists fear his interference and kidnap him Sunday morning, 
taking him to their base downtown.
 It is convenient now to introduce notation for our causal diagrams. 
Let (x) represent a designated fact and B(Y,x) represent Y’s belief of x. As 
with Goldman’s analysis, arrows represent causal connections. Unlike 
Goldman’s diagrams, I will just use solid arrows and assume that solid ar-




 Returning to our example, let (p)=Jack’s being downtown Sunday, 
(j)=Jack’s intending to go downtown Sunday, (k)=Jack’s getting kidnapped, 
(t)=Jack’s telling Renee he intends to go downtown on Sunday, R=Renee, 
and (u), (v) be auxiliary facts that provide justification for Renee’s inference 
that Jack actually will go downtown, such as Jack’s honest, reliability, etc. 
The causal diagram for this situation looks, roughly, like the following:
 
Figure 1. Causal diagram for case 1.
 It is clear that there is a causal link between Jack’s being downtown 
Sunday and Renee’s believing Jack will be downtown Sunday, but intui-
tively, Renee does not know on Saturday that Jack will be downtown on 
Sunday.
 The causal theorist must give an account of either where the causal 
chain is broken or how the theory can be adjusted to accommodate these 
cases. The causal theorist might just require that the believer have com-
plete knowledge of the causal chain. This is obviously too strong a require-
ment on knowledge, however. For example, it might be the case that I dis-
cover a series of incorrect, hand-written multiplication tables in the library 
and correct them, thus allowing future readers to learn the multiplication 
tables. Future readers need not know that I corrected the tables in order for 
them to learn multiplication from them. Thus we see that for a belief to be 
justified the believer need not know the entire causal connection between 
the belief and the fact that makes it true.
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 The causal theorist might be uncomfortable with the role that inten-
tion plays in this example. He might hold that Renee does not just believe 
(p), she believes more strongly that Jack will go downtown of his own voli-
tion. Renee’s belief that Jack will go downtown is contingent on her belief 
that his intention to go downtown of his own volition will be satisfied. 
If she had reason to believe that terrorists would kidnap Jack, she likely 
would not believe he would wind up downtown (unless of course she 
knew that’s where the terrorists would take him). Thus the causal theorist 
might suggest that Renee’s belief that Jack will go downtown voluntarily 
be included in the causal diagram. Since this belief is false, the causal chain 
fails and Renee does not have knowledge. 
 Since the best route of escape for the causal theorist is to show that 
what Renee really believes is false, I will present a pair of brief modifica-
tions of the original case to show that  attempts to state Renee’s belief in a 
way that works for the causal theory will either (i) be too complex, allow-
ing us to construct a case where what Renee supposedly believes is false 
but in which she clearly has knowledge or (ii) be too simple, allowing us to 
construct a case where what Renee supposedly believes is true but insuf-
ficient for knowledge.
 The causal theorist cannot get too stingy about what Renee thinks 
of Jack’s intentions. To see this, consider the following:
 
 Case 1a: Just like Case 1, except Jack escapes the terrorists    
 and accomplishes his original goal of having lunch     
 downtown.
In Case 1a, it would make sense to say that Renee’s belief about Jack be-
ing downtown constituted knowledge (since the kidnapping was just an 
unexpected diversion that resulted in his being downtown), even though 
her belief that he would go downtown of his own volition was false (since, 
6. Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing,“ 368.
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although he remained downtown voluntarily, he went downtown invol-
untarily). Moreover, any of Renee’s beliefs about how Jack was going to 
get downtown would be false. Once we take this into account, the causal 
theorist is left saying that Renee believes something like ‘Jack will at some 
point on Sunday be downtown of his own volition’. This belief is not spe-
cific enough, however.
 Case 1b: Just like Case 1 except Jack escapes the terrorists    
 and instead of having lunch downtown he runs to warn the  
 President about the terrorists.
 In Case 1b, Renee’s JTB ‘Jack will at some point on Sunday be down-
town of his own volition’ would not constitute knowledge, even though 
it is still causally connected to the fact that makes it true (the e-mail that 
caused her belief caused Jack to be kidnapped which in turn caused him to 
be downtown of his own volition to warn the President of the attack). This 
forces the causal theorist to amend Renee’s belief yet again to say some-
thing like ‘Jack will at some point on Sunday be downtown in an effort to 
satisfy some expectation that prompted his e-mail.’ It is clear that this is far 
more complicated than the belief that Renee intuitively has, namely just 
that Jack will be downtown on Sunday.
 These complications suggest that complex beliefs should be avoid-
ed in the causal diagram in favor of their simpler constituents (that is, Re-
nee actually has a collections of beliefs: {Jack will be downtown, Jack wants 
to go downtown, Jack will voluntarily get downtown...} some of which are 
true and some of which are false), otherwise one winds up with lengthy, 
convoluted beliefs that are intuitively very different from anything Renee 
actually believes. Notice that Goldman requires that enough of Renee’s be-
liefs to be true to “ensure the existence of at least one causal connection.”6 
This being the case, if Renee’s beliefs about Jack’s going downtown are 
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broken into their simplest possible constituents, it is clear that there is some 
causal connection of true beliefs that lead to Renee’s belief that Jack will be 
downtown on Sunday, even if there are many false beliefs (about Jack’s
intention, method of getting downtown, etc.) that also support that 
conclusion.
 The causal theorist might yet be convinced that Renee’s beliefs 
about Jack’s intentions are critical to her conclusion that he will be down-
town. I will now present a case of JTB+C which requires no discussion of 
intention and yet presents a problem for the causal theory; this is the case 
of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
 Case 2: Gene, who has an impeccable track record and is highly 
skilled at stock analysis, and who knows that company A is going to an-
nounce a new product this month, comes to the conclusion that the price 
of stock A will rise by $100 over the next month. Gene tells some friends of 
this expectation and his prediction quickly becomes the talk of Wall Street. 
Knowing Gene’s track record, traders everywhere start buying stock A at 
higher and higher prices until by the end of the month the stock has risen 
by over $100. However, because the media is saturated with talk of Gene’s 
report, when company A announces the new product, no one pays any 
attention. That is, the only factor that causes anyone to buy stock A that 
month is Gene’s prediction. Did Gene know, at the start of the month, that 
the stock would rise by over $100? 
 Let the following be our notation, G=Gene, P1 through Pn=people 
who invest in stock A, (a)=The fact that company A is going to make a 
product announcement this month, (m)=The fact that stock A goes up $100 
over the next month, (u)=Auxiliary beliefs about stock A and company A, 
(pi)=Person Pi buys stock A (where i goes from 1 to n for some large n), and 
A(Y,x)=the assertion of belief x by believer Y. Then the causal diagram for 




Figure 2. Causal diagram for Case 2.
 Notice that the only causal role of (a) is to cause Gene’s belief of 
(a); (a) does not directly cause any other individuals to believe stock A is 
going to rise by $100, those beliefs are all a result of Gene’s assertion that 
the stock will rise by $100. Figure 2 illuminates the fact that self-fulfilling 
prophecies have exotic causal diagrams where a belief in some fact causes 
that fact to be true.
 The causal theorist is now faced with a dilemma: if Gene has knowl-
edge in this case, then it seems that all justified self-fulfilling prophecies 
should constitute knowledge, which is counter-intuitive. If for instance, the 
US government announces that they’re investigating company A, which 
would send the stock down were it not for Gene’s media-saturating proph-
ecy, we would say that Gene did not really know that the stock would 
reach $100. So long as Gene is justified in his beliefs about the strength of 
the company, however, the causal diagram would not show any difference 
between this case and Case 2. 
 On the other hand, if Gene’s belief of (m) is not knowledge, then the 
causal theorist has to explain where the causal chain faults, which he seem-
ingly cannot do. The temptation is to claim that Gene has the false belief 
that the stock will go up as a result of how good the company is. This is not 
a false belief, however, as the strength of the company causes the prophecy 
which, in turn, causes the stock to rise. The causal theorist may simply dis-
allow causal chains in which a belief is the cause of some fact which makes 
that belief true. This prohibition would be problematic first for cases where 
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a belief might be one of many causes of some fact that makes the belief true, 
and moreover for cases such as Case 2, where a completely sound proph-
ecy is incidentally self-fulfilling.
 Self-fulfilling prophecies thus present a clear problem for the causal 
theorist. If a belief of p is the cause of p, then clearly the belief and the fact 
are causally connected, but it seems a stretch to say that all self-fulfilling 
prophecies constitute knowledge, particularly those in which the prophecy 
certainly would not have come true were it not made. The consideration of 
what might have happened had the prophecy not been made motivates a 
possible way for the causal theorist to deal with the problem of self-fulfill-
ing prophecies. A causal theorist might claim that a self-fulfilling prophecy 
constitutes knowledge if it is the case that, were the prophecy never made, 
the belief would have been justified, true, and causally linked to the fact 
that makes it true. Under this explanation, Case 2 seems to be a legitimate 
case of knowledge, assuming that without Gene’s prediction saturating the 
media, the product announcement would cause the price of stock A to rise 
by $100.
 Assume we accept the inclusion of counterfactuals into the causal 
theory, postulating something like: “A justified, true belief is knowledge if 
and only if it is causally connected to the fact that makes it true and only 
if a causal connection would be present had the belief never been asserted 
or acted upon.”7  This definition of knowledge better handles cases of self-
fulfilling prophecies, but is more difficult to use than the original causal 
theory. For example, to determine whether Gene had knowledge in Case 2, 
we must imagine a world in which Gene never makes the prophecy. Doing 
IV: Counterfactuals
7. At first glance, one might worry that if, for example, I do not act upon my belief that I will have a 
sandwich for lunch that I will never have said sandwich and thus cannot have knowledge about my 
future behavior. I do not take my belief that I will have a sandwich for lunch to be 
a cause of my having a sandwich for lunch, however, I rather take the belief and the 
fact to both be effects of my desire and ability to have a sandwich for lunch.
this, and examining the causal chain within the imagined world, is much 
more complicated and significantly less reliable than the empirical inves-
tigation required determining instances of knowledge under the original 
causal theory.
 In order for the causal theory to be sufficiently repaired to handle 
self-fulfilling prophecies, its expedience must be sacrificed. Whereas the 
classic causal theory allowed for knowledge to be determined on an empir-
ical basis, the amended causal theory requires an investigation of counter-
factual situations, a much less reliable method for identifying knowledge. 
Ultimately, cases of the sort I have presented reveal serious defects in the 
causal theory that cannot be repaired without complicating the theory in 
suspect and unsatisfactory ways. v
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